At Whitsuntide, 1920, some five years before his death at the age of sixty-four, Dr. Rudolf Steiner, Austrian philosopher and mystic, delivered three lectures in Dornach, Switzerland, on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. In these lectures, now published in The Redemption of Thinking, he set himself to prove that his “Spiritual Science” was really a development of the teaching of Aquinas. The arguments on which he based this conclusion are: first, a very personal interpretation of the relation of 13th century (...) Thomism to the thought of preceding and subsequent centuries; second, the backing of a Cistercian professor of theology at Vienna University who told Dr. Steiner, after a lecture on Goethe, that “The germ of this address which you have given us to-day is to be found in Thomas Aquinas”; and third, one reference to the Summa Theologica, 1, q.2, art. 3, and one quotation from Aquinas—“Everything in the human body, even down to the vegetative activities, is occasioned and directed by soul-forces and must be understood in that light”. Even apart from this rather weak backing, it is easy to see that “Spiritual Science” as expounded by Dr. Steiner is certainly not “Thomism in its twentieth century form”. Aquinas would never accept what is implied in such statements as these: “When we penetrate beneath the surface of this material world, we discover that it is in fact a spiritual world, and that beyond the veil of nature the ultimate realities are not material atoms but spiritual beings” ; or, “I should never find the bridge to the real world if I did not bring the idea-world, which I have separated off in myself, once more into unity with that which, without the ideaworld, is no reality at all” ; or, “We must overcome dogmatism in empirical science to-day just as, on the other hand, we must overcome dogmatism in revealed religion”. (shrink)

Nesta obra, o autor, busca essas duas dimensões da herança do autor da Pedagogia do oprimido: análise das convergências e divergências de seu pensamento com o de Lucien Goldmann e Edgar Morin e de suas idéias com o final do século XX.

Deliberative democracy entails a commitment to deciding political questions on their merits. To that end, people engage in an exchange of reasons in a shared endeavour to arrive at the right answer or the best judgement they can make in the circumstances. Of course, in practice a shared judgement may be impossible to reach. Yet while compromise may seem a natural way of dealing with the disagreement that deliberation leaves unresolved – for example, some deliberative theorists argue that a willingness (...) to compromise manifests respect for the considered views of others, even as we continue to disagree with them – the relationship between deliberation and compromise is not as straightforward as one might think. To explain why, this paper contrasts conflicts of judgement with conflicts of preference, interest and value to show why greater attention needs to be paid to the character of the decision to be made. (shrink)

This Element is a philosophical history of Social Darwinism. It begins by discussing the meaning of the term, moving then to its origins, paying particular attention to whether it is Charles Darwin or Herbert Spencer who is the true father of the idea. It gives an exposition of early thinking on the subject, covering Darwin and Spencer themselves and then on to Social Darwinism as found in American thought, with special emphasis on Andrew Carnegie, and Germany with special emphasis on (...) Friedrich von Bernhardi. Attention is also paid to outliers, notably the Englishman Alfred Russel Wallace, the Russian Peter Kropotkin, and the German Friedrich Nietzsche. From here we move into the twentieth century looking at Adolf Hitler - hardly a regular Social Darwinian given he did not believe in evolution - and in the Anglophone world, Julian Huxley and Edward O. Wilson, who reflected the concerns of their society. (shrink)

This article argues that reality and virtuality are still very much phenomenologically distinguishable, although this might not be the case forever. I argue for two main types of virtuality – one inherently involved in the dynamic horizons of perceptual experiences, while the other is all of our experiences of digital images – in order to show that a particular possible instantiation of the latter type, namely “pure” mixed reality (MR), might come to blur and collapse various experiential categories in the (...) future, not least real and irreal, like never before. To show this, there are three main sections. First, I outline my understanding of the two basic types of virtuality, as understood from a classical phenomenological analysis. Second, I give an account of the most important family of “virtual technologies” relevant to the question at hand, namely virtual, augmented and mixed reality (VR, AR and MR respectively) technologies. After homing in on MR, I explain what “pure” MR is and how, through tactile holograms, this might change even basic experiential distinctions going forward, and not necessarily for the better. (shrink)

An analysis of how Adorno's "pure" philosophy can be seen to provide a justification of the rationality required by critical theory.

First published in 1988, the aim of this book can be stated in Nietzsche’s words: ‘To look at science from the perspective of the artist, but at art from that of life’. The title contests the notions that science alone can provide us with the most objective truth about the world, and that artistic endeavour can produce nothing more valuable than entertainment. O’Hear argues that art and the study of art are not indispensable aspects of human life, and that this (...) is equally as important as the investigation of the natural world. (shrink)

Negative emotion differentiation has been suggested to be important for adaptive emotion regulation. However, knowledge concerning how ED may impact specific ER strategy choice remains surprisingly sparse. We therefore investigated if person-level negative ED was associated with habitual use of individual ER strategies, how person-level negative ED was associated with daily use of individual ER strategies, and finally how within-person daily fluctuations in negative ED were associated with daily use of individual ER strategies. During a 10-day experience sampling study, 90 (...) healthy participants rated their momentary emotions and their ER efforts in response to those emotions. ER strategies included four putatively adaptive strategies and four putatively maladaptive strategies. Results revealed that negative ED at the person level was neither associated with habitual nor daily ER strategy endorsement when controlling for negative emotions. Likewise, associations between within-individual daily variation in negative ED and daily ER did not remain statistically significant after controlling for negative emotions. The results thus point to no or weak associations between negative ED and ER choice above and beyond negative emotions. Future experimental studies addressing ED at the momentary level and teasing out the ED–ER causal timeline are needed to further evaluate ED–ER associations. Findings from such research may represent an important step toward refining psychotherapeutic interventions aimed at improving emotional problems. (shrink)

Through recourse to Gilles Deleuze’s short polemical essay ‘Postscript on Control Societies’ and the accompanying interview (in Negotiations) on ‘Control and Becoming’, this article attempts to map out the conceptual contours of an artistic war machine (Deleuze’s ‘new weapons’) that might be pitched against control and also play a role in the more ethico-political function of the constitution of a people (or, what Deleuze calls subjectification). Along the way a series of other Deleuzian concepts are introduced and outlined – with (...) an eye to their pertinence for art practice and, indeed, for any more general ‘thought’ against control. At stake here is the development of a concept of fictioning – the production of alternative narratives and image-worlds – and also the idea of art practice as a form of myth-science, exemplified by Burroughs’ cut-up method. It is argued that these aesthetic strategies might offer alternative models for a subjectivity that is increasingly standardized and hemmed in by neoliberalism. (shrink)

Book description: * Seventeen brand-new essays by leading philosophers and psychologists * Genuinely interdisciplinary work, at the forefront of both fields * Includes a valuable introduction, uniting common threads Leading philosophers and psychologists join forces to investigate a set of problems to do with agency and self-awareness, in seventeen specially written essays. In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that (...) free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. Patients with Anarchic Hand syndrome sometimes find their hands perform apparently goal-directed actions which the patients disown, yet seem to be unable to suppress (for example, reaching out for someone else's food in a restaurant). On the face of it, these patients lack the kind of control and self-awareness we ordinarily take ourselves to have when acting intentionally. Questions raised by this phenomenon include: What is involved in being aware of an action as one's own? What is the nature of the control these patients are lacking and which characterizes normal intentional actions? What is the relation between a priori explanations of consciousness and self-consciousness, on the one hand, and empirical work on the information-processing mechanisms involved in action control, on the other? Questions of action control and self-awareness tend to be treated separately in both philosophy and psychology. The central idea behind this volume is that outstanding unresolved issues on both topics, and in both disciplines, can only be resolved by an interdisciplinary examination of the relations between them. The editors' useful introductory essay offers a guide to cross-disciplinary reading of the contributions, and makes connections between them explicit. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness. (shrink)

The article seeks to explore the mindset of young émigré poets of the 1920s–1930s, to identify possible ideological influences on the literature and literary criticism of the first wave of Russian emigration and to determine the spiritual origins of the ‘Paris Note.’ Among many other influences on the young émigré poetry (Henri Bergson, Nikolai Berdyaev, Vasily Rozanov, Nikolai Fedorov and others) the influence of Lev Shestov’s philosophy is particularly evident. However, it manifested itself not directly but indirectly, mainly through the (...) Parisian critic Georgy Adamovich, who, unlike young poets, read Shestov carefully and appreciated him very highly. The philosophy of Adamovich’s poetry, which brought to life the phenomenon of the ‘Paris Note,’ had many parallels with Shestov’s thoughts. Hence the unexpected concordance between the central issues and artistic practice of the participants of the ‘Paris Note’ and Existentialism emerging in the 1930s in the literature of France. (shrink)

Empedocles' fr. 24 is known only from its quotation by Plutarch. The words as quoted leave themselves open to divergent interpretations. The context in Plutarch nonetheless holds out some hope of being able to decide which of the divergent interpretations would have matched the use that Empedocles himself made of the two verses in his poem.

En este trabajo analizamos la representación de la Iglesia como aparato ideológico en el desenlace de la novela Capítulos que se le olvidaron a Cervantes, del autor ecuatoriano Juan Montalvo. Nos concentramos en su final pues entendemos que dicha parte resume las principales representaciones del autor vinculadas a esta institución. El análisis será complementado con una contextualización del origen de la novela y de las premisas ideológicas centrales de Montalvo, apoyándonos en remisiones a algunos de sus trabajos ensayísticos. Asimismo, comentaremos (...) las repercusiones que dichas representaciones tuvieron en la formalización de los dos personajes medulares de su novela. Para atender a estos propósitos, seguiremos los conceptos teóricos de Aparatos Ideológicos del Estado según Althusser y de Ideología y Representaciones Sociales conforme van Djik. (shrink)

This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first-person indexical. It is argued that the private nature of our access to our own sensations forces, in our talking about them, an indexical reference to the inner states of the speaker in lieu of publicly accessible properties by which reference is usually fixed. Indexicals, such as ‘here’, can be understood despite ignorance of their referent. Such is the case with sensory terms. Furthermore, the thesis that (...) sensory terms are indexical has considerable explanatory power. I give two examples: firstly, I argue that clashes of intuition over Block's ‘inverted spectrum’ thought experiment can be explained by appeal to semantic properties of indexicals. Secondly, I argue that multiple realisability intuitions can be shown to be consistent with the view that sensations are type-identical with brain states. (shrink)

One of the few studies to date which considers in a comprehensive way the relation between these remarkable thinkers. By concrete example and continual reference it illustrates both the pervasive influence of Pseudo-Dionysius and the profound originality of Aquinas.

We analyse the electronic portfolio in higher education policy and practice.While evangelical accounts of the ePortfolio celebrate its power as a new eLearning technology,we argue that it allows the mutually-reinforcing couple of neoliberalism and the enterprising self to function in ways in which individual difference can be presented, cultured and grown, all the time within a standardised framework which relentlessly polices the limits of the acceptable and unacceptable. We point to the ePortfolio as a practice of government, arguing that grander (...) policy coalesces out of a halting, experimental set of technological instruments for thinking about how life should be lived. (shrink)

My disagreement with the deflationist treatment of truth affects my attitude to Paul Horwich’s approach to meaning and intentionality. In my response I summarize objections to the deflationist account of truth developed in some detail in chapters 2, 7, and 12, and argue that the notion of intentionality should be treated naturalistically in a broader context than the context of the referential import of the locution “means that”.Minha discordância com a visão deflacionista da verdade afeta minha atitude em relação às (...) propostas deflacionistas de Paul Horwich para a intencio-nalidade. Em minha réplica faço um resumo das objeções ao deflacionismo em relação à verdade, detalhadas nos capítulos 2, 7 e 12, e argumento que a noção de intencionalidade deveria ser tratada naturalisticamente em um contexto mais amplo que o contexto do alcance referencial da locução “significa que”. (shrink)

Frank Sautter’s questions are directed at the precise senses of the words ‘invention’ and ‘creation’ used in my remarks on the origin of language, and at the connection between Jørgensen’s and my views on the development of language. In my response I clarify my use of the words ‘invention’ and ‘creation’ vis-à-vis Frank’s suggested interpretations, and examine Jørgensen’s distinction of stages in the development of language in relation to imperatives and the “directive use of language”.As perguntas de Frank Sautter estão (...) direcionadas ao sentido mais preciso das palavras ‘invenção’ e ‘criação’ utilizadas em minhas observações sobre a origem da linguagem, e à relação de meu ponto de vista sobre o desenvolvimento da linguagem ao de Jørgensen. Em minha réplica esclareço meu uso das palavras ‘invenção’ e ‘criação’ comparativamente às diversas interpretações sugeridas por Frank, e examino a distinção de estágios no desenvolvimento da linguagem proposta por Jørgensen em relação aos imperativos e ao “uso direcionado da linguagem”. (shrink)

Scholars have characterised the trial of the life of pleasure in Philebus 20b-21d as digressive or pejorative. I argue that it is neither: it is a thought experiment containing an important argument, in the form of a reductio, of the hypothesis that a life could be most pleasant without cognition. It proceeds in a series of steps, culminating in the precisely chosen image of the jellyfish. Understanding the intended resonance of this creature, and the sense in which it is deprived, (...) is critical for reconstructing the argument, and yields new insight into Plato’s views on the minimal conditions for pleasure. (shrink)

Walter Carnielli argues that my position about knowledge and justification emphasizes individual knowledge, is too demanding, and is anti-psychologistic. In my response I argue that this reflects a misunderstanding of the view of knowledge and justification sketched in my book, and that our views on these issues are much closer than he imagines.Walter Carnielli argumenta que minha posição com respeito ao conhecimento e à justificação enfatiza o conhecimento individual, é demasiadamente exigente e é anti-psicologista. Em minha réplica argumento que isto (...) reflete um mal entendido em relação ao ponto de vista sobre conhecimento e justificação esboçado em meu livro, e que nossas visões dessas questões são muito mais próximas do que ele imagina. (shrink)

This volume provides the fundamentals needed to understand the various explanatory systems and methodologies used in the behavior sciences and to evaluate their findings, in particular the literature and findings on buyer behavior. In clear prose, the author discusses the key issues in modern philosophy, psychology, and sociology and their relevance for the student of marketing and buyer behavior. O'Shaughnessy exploits insights from many disciplines as to the many ways to derive understanding of behavioral phenomena, making it accessible not only (...) to academics and students of marketing, but to professionals as well. (shrink)

The general content of the book is dedicated to the dialectical practices and their logical tools and techniques developed after Plato and Aristotle within the philosophical schools of the Hellenis...

In recent years, as the enterprise of speculative metaphysics has attained a newfound measure of respectability, incompatibilist philosophers who are inclined to think that freedom of action is not only possible, but actual, have re-emerged to take on the formidable task of providing a satisfactory indeterministic account of the connections among an agent's freedom to do otherwise, her reasons, and her control over her act. In this paper, I want to examine three of these proposals, all of which give novel (...) twists to familiar themes. I will argue that despite the considerable ingenuity these philosophers evince, their attempts do not succeed. A common criticism of these theories will be that they fail to give a satisfactory account of what I term "agent-control," a certain feature of actions whose presence I take to be a central requirement for any workable model of responsible agency. I believe that the general notion I try to capture under this label is implicit in much of the voluminous discussion of the problem of free will (especially in compatibilist criticisms of libertarianism), although I am unaware of any explicit formulations of it in just the way I have in mind. Simply put, agent-control is that feature of the process of agency that accounts for how a particular piece of behavior is connected to, or an 'outflowing of, the agent, i.e., that which allows us properly to assert that the action was controlled by the agent. (shrink)

Qualia have proved difficult to integrate into a broadly physicalistic worldview. In this paper, I argue that despite popular wisdom in the philosophy of mind, qualia’s intrinsicality is not sufficient for their non-reducibility. Second, I diagnose why philosophers mistakenly focused on intrinsicality. I then proceed to argue that qualia are categorical and end with some reflections on how the conceptual territory looks when we keep our focus on categoricity.